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Jurisdictional Statement
This court has jurisdiction under section 78A-3-102(3)(j) of the Utah Code.
Introduction
Unlike statutes of limitation, statutes of repose typically are not tolled. At a
minimum, there is nothing absurd about a legislature’s choice to toll a statute of
limitation but not toll a statute of repose. That observation is dispositive here.
Section 78B-3-404 of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act contains a twoyear statute of limitation that begins when a plaintiff “discovers” his injury and a
four-year statute of repose that begins on “the date of the alleged act, omission,
neglect, or occurrence.” A different section, section 78B-3-416(3)(a), “tolls the
applicable statute of limitations,” but does not mention the statute of repose. The
district court nonetheless interpreted section 416 to toll the statute of repose
because enforcing the plain language would be unfair.
Under the absurdity doctrine, courts can ignore plain language only if its
enforcement produces results that are “overwhelmingly absurd.” But there is
nothing overwhelmingly absurd about a legislature’s choice to toll a statute of
limitation but not a statute of repose. And if section 416 did not toll the statute of
repose here, then Mr. Jensen’s claim is untimely.
The district court erred in tolling the statute of repose, contrary to the plain
language of section 416. This court should reverse and remand with instructions
for the district court to dismiss Mr. Jensen’s claim as untimely.
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Statement of the Issues
Issue 1: Whether the district court erred in interpreting the four-year time
period for commencing a malpractice action against a health care provider in
section 78B-3-404(1) of the Utah Code to be a statute of limitation rather than a
statute of repose, where the four-year period begins at the time of an “alleged
act, omission, neglect, or occurrence” instead of at the time the plaintiff discovers
a legal injury.
Issue 2: Whether the district court erred in interpreting section
78B-3-416(3) of the Utah Code, which “tolls the applicable statute of limitations,”
to toll the four-year statute of repose, in addition to various statutes of limitation,
set forth in section 78B-3-404.
Standard of Review: This court reviews a district court’s legal conclusions
and denial of summary judgment for correctness, viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Fort Pierce Indus. Park Phases II, III & IV
Owners Ass’n v. Shakespeare, 2016 UT 28, ¶ 17, 379 P.3d 1218.
Preservation: Intermountain preserved these issues in its motion for
summary judgment at R.186-92.
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Determinative Provisions
The following statutes are determinative of the appeal and are set forth at
Addendum A:
Utah Code § 78B-3-404

Statute of Limitations—Exceptions—Application

Utah Code § 78B-3-416

Division to provide panel—Exemption—
Procedures—Statute of limitations tolled—
Composition of panel—Expenses—Division
authorized to set license fees
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Statement of the Case
1.

Nature of the Case
This is a medical malpractice action arising out of medical care that Erik

Jensen received from Intermountain Healthcare, Inc. and IHC Health Services
dba LDS Hospital (collectively, Intermountain). (R.223,412.) Mr. Jensen filed his
action beyond the four-year statute of repose set forth in section 78B-3-404(1) of
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. (R.412-13.) Intermountain filed a motion
for summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Jensen’s action was time barred.
(R.186.) Mr. Jensen opposed the motion, arguing that his action was timely
because the statute of repose was “tolled” by section 78B-3-416, which “tolls the
applicable statute of limitations.” (R.226-35.) The district court agreed with
Mr. Jensen and denied the motion for summary judgment. (R.424.)
2.

Statement of Facts
Erik Jensen was admitted to LDS Hospital with abdominal pain and

cramping. (R.224.) On April 1, 2010, while at the hospital, he went into cardiac
arrest and suffered severe and permanent injuries.1 (Id.) He alleges that his
injuries were caused by Intermountain’s negligence. (R.3-4.) He filed his lawsuit
on February 2, 2015, more than four years after the alleged negligence. (R.8.)
Intermountain moved for summary judgment on the ground that
Mr. Jensen’s claims were barred by the four-year statute of repose in the Utah
Because the act occurred in 2010, Intermountain cites to the 2010 version of
the Utah Code.
1
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Health Care Malpractice Act. (R.186.) The Act provides that a malpractice action
must be filed within two years after discovery of the injury, “but not to exceed
four years after the date of the alleged act.” Utah Code § 78B-3-404(1).
“Notwithstanding” those provisions, the Act provides a one-year statute of
limitation for actions alleging fraudulent concealment and for actions alleging
that an object has been wrongfully left within a patient’s body. Id. § 78B-3-404(2).
Neither one-year statute of limitation applies here. Thus, the Act provides three
statutes of limitation and one statute of repose. Id. § 78B-3-404.
Mr. Jensen opposed Intermountain’s motion for summary judgment,
arguing that the statute of repose had been “tolled.” (R.226-35.) Mr. Jensen relied
on section 416 of the Act, which provides that filing a request for prelitigation
panel review “tolls the applicable statute of limitations” until 60 days after the
division issues a certificate of compliance. Utah Code § 78B-3-416(3)(a)(i).
Mr. Jensen argued that the “statute of limitations” language should be read to
include the statute of repose, and he concluded that he had until February 24,
2015, to file his complaint. (R.226-35.)
The following dates are relevant to Mr. Jensen’s argument:2
Apr. 1, 2010

Alleged medical negligence (R.3-4)

The date of the certificate of compliance listed in the court’s order is
incorrect, but the error does not affect Intermountain’s argument. (R.413,226.)
2
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Mar. 21, 2014

Mr. Jensen serves notice of intent to
commence action3 (R.225)

Mar. 21, 2014

Mr. Jensen files request for
prelitigation panel (R.225)

Dec. 26, 2014

Division issues certificate of
compliance (R.226)

Feb. 2, 2015

Mr. Jensen files complaint (R.1,8)

The district court denied the motion for summary judgment. (R.424.) The
court questioned, but ultimately did not decide, whether the four-year period
was a statute of repose. (R.492-93.) The court instead concluded that section 416
“tolls both the two- and four-year limitations” periods even though the statute
states that it tolls only “the applicable statute of limitations.” (R.424.) The court
ruled that the legislature did not intend to treat the two time periods differently.
(R.414.)
The court articulated four grounds for its ruling. First, the court noted that
the title of the section containing the statute of repose is titled “Statute of
limitations—Exceptions—Application.” (R.418.) Second, the court noted that
section 416 “refers to the ‘applicable statute of limitations,’” which suggests that
the statute contains more than one statute of limitation. (R.418.) Third, the court
noted that the legislature did not use the phrase “statute of repose” in the Act,
and that appellate courts have been “similarly imprecise” when discussing the

Because the notice was served within 90 days of the expiration of the statute
of repose, Mr. Jensen’s time to file a complaint was “extended to 120 days from
the date of service of notice,” which was July 19, 2014. Utah Code § 78B-3-412(4).
3
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difference between the two. (R.419.) And fourth, the court noted that, unlike
other statutes of repose, the four-year period in the Act is subject to other tolling
exceptions, such as the provision in section 412. (R.419.)
The district court seemed to recognize that its ruling contradicted the plain
language of section 416, and it articulated three reasons for its refusal to enforce
the plain language interpretation. First, the court noted that the plain language
reading “does nothing to advance the policy concerns recognized by the
legislature when it passed the Act.” (R.422.) Second, the court ruled that
applying the plain language would force claimants to file premature lawsuits to
avoid the effect of the statute of repose. (R.423.) And third, the court ruled that it
would be “unfair” to require claimants to comply with the procedures outlined
in the Act but not to toll the time the division takes to complete its process.
(R.422.) The district court did not analyze the absurdity doctrine, which is the
doctrine that must apply before a court may refuse to enforce the plain language
of a statute.
Intermountain filed a petition for permission to appeal the district court’s
interlocutory order, and this court granted the petition. (R.448.) This court also
decided to retain jurisdiction to address the issue of how to interpret the tolling
language in section 78B-3-416.
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Summary of the Argument
It is undisputed that Mr. Jensen filed his claim against Intermountain
beyond the four-year limitation period in section 78B-3-404(1). The only issue is
whether section 78B-3-416(3) operated to toll the statute of repose. It did not.
Section 78B-3-404(1) of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act contains
three different statutes of limitation and a four-year statute of repose. The statute
of repose precludes any action not filed within “four years after the date of the
alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence.” Utah Code § 78B-3-404(1). This is a
classic statute of repose, something this court has recognized repeatedly. Arnold
v. Grigsby, 2012 UT 61, ¶ 13, 289 P.3d 449 ( “[t]he Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act provides . . . a four-year statute of repose for the filing of medical malpractice
actions”); Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 576 (Utah 1993) (referencing “[t]he four-year
repose period” in the Act); Sorensen v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336, 1336 (Utah 1987)
(“plaintiff’s claim was barred by the four-year statute of repose” in the Act).
Because the four-year period is a statute of repose, it is not tolled under
section 78B-3-416(3). The plain language of section 416 “tolls the applicable
statute of limitations” during the review of the prelitigation panel, but does not
toll the statute of repose. Utah Code § 78B-3-416(3)(a). Despite the plain language
of section 416 referencing only statutes of limitation, the district court interpreted
section 416 to toll the statute of repose because enforcing the plain language
would be unfair and could produce harsh results. The district court appears to
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have refused to enforce plain language under the absurdity doctrine, without
providing sufficient grounds for doing so.
Under the absurdity doctrine, courts may refuse to enforce the plain
language of a statute—and adopt alternative language—only when the operation
of the plain language is “so overwhelmingly absurd that no rational legislator
could have intended the statute to operate in such a manner.” Utley v. Mill Man
Steel, Inc., 2015 UT 75, ¶ 48, 57 P.3d 992 (Durrant, J., concurring and dissenting).
Applying the absurdity doctrine is a “momentous” and “drastic step” because it
overrides the plain language of the statute and applies an interpretation that is
“contrary to its plain meaning.” Id. ¶¶ 47-48 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court applies the doctrine “with caution,” and the court will not override
statutory language “even if it leads to results [this court] regard[s] as impractical
or ill-advised.” Id. ¶ 48. Instead, for this court to apply the absurdity doctrine to
override the statutory language, “the operation of the plain language must be
more than improvident, it must be so overwhelmingly absurd that no rational
legislator could have intended the statute to operate in such a manner.” Id.
Here, it is not overwhelmingly absurd to toll a statute of limitation but not
a statute of repose. Statutes of repose by their nature can be unfair from the
perspective of plaintiffs because they rarely are tolled. The operation of statutes
of repose, even when unfair, is not absurd, let alone overwhelmingly absurd.
This court should reverse because the absurdity doctrine does not apply.
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Argument
The district court erred in its interpretation of sections 78B-3-404 and
78B-3-416 of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. The court refused to enforce
the plain language of both sections and instead ruled that section 416 tolls the
well-established four-year statute of repose in section 404, despite the plain
language in section 416 that tolls only the “applicable statute of limitations.”
Utah Code § 78B-3-416(3)(a). The district court should have enforced the plain
language and dismissed Mr. Jensen’s claim as untimely under the four-year
statute of repose.
This brief proceeds in three stages. In the first stage, Intermountain
demonstrates that the four-year period in section 404 is a statute of repose, not a
statute of limitation, because it begins with the occurrence of an alleged wrongful
act, not with the discovery of a claim or a legal injury. In the second stage,
Intermountain demonstrates that the plain language of section 416 tolls only the
“applicable statute of limitations,” not the statute of repose. In the third stage,
Intermountain demonstrates that the absurdity doctrine does not apply, and,
therefore, the district court erred when it ignored the plain language of section
416 and instead ruled that section 416 tolled the statute of repose.

10

1.

The Four-Year Period in Section 404 is a Statute of Repose
Section 404 contains a two-year statute of limitation, two different one-year

statutes of limitation, and a four-year statute of repose. Before examining the
language in section 404, it is worth contrasting, in general, statutes of limitation
with statutes of repose.
Both statutes of limitation and statutes of repose operate to bar a plaintiff’s
suit, so “to some extent they serve the same ends.” Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985). When precision is not required,
“courts, legislatures, and commentators have been sometimes inconsistent in
their use of the terms.” Raithaus v. Saab-Scandia of Am., Inc., 784 P.2d 1158, 1161
(Utah 1989). But as this court has noted, “[b]ecause the goals, functions, and
characteristics of each type of statute differ, statutes of repose and statutes of
limitations are not interchangeable.” Id.
Whether a provision is a statute of limitation or a statute of repose is
determined by how it operates, not by its label. Courts routinely recognize that a
provision is a statute of repose even when the statute does not label it as such.
E.g., In re Estate of Strand, 2015 UT App 259, ¶ 8, 362 P.3d 739 (holding that the
three-year limitation in section 75-3-107 is a statute of repose); Willis v. DeWitt,
2015 UT App 123, ¶¶ 8-9, 350 P.3d 250 (holding that the six-year period in section
78B-2-225 is a statute of repose).
Statutes of limitation start at the discovery of the injury while statutes of
repose start at the last act that caused the injury. Put differently, statutes of
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limitation begin “based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury
occurred or was discovered).” Statute of Limitations, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th
ed. 2014); CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S.Ct. 2175, 2182 (2014) (same). In the case
of medical malpractice, a claimant’s action accrues when he discovers, or
through reasonable diligence should have discovered, his injury.
Statutes of repose, in contrast, begin on “the date of the last culpable act or
omission of the defendant.” CTS, 134 S.Ct. at 2182; Statute of Repose, Black’s Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (begins on the date the defendant last acted). For
medical malpractice, this is the date of the alleged malpractice, “irrespective of
whether the malpractice is known or knowable.” Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 576
(Utah 1993).
Statutes of limitation also differ from statutes of repose because they are
subject to equitable tolling, which “pauses the running of, or ‘tolls,’ a statute of
limitations when the litigant has pursued his rights diligently but some
extraordinary circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely action.” CTS,
134 S.Ct. at 2183.; see also Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ¶ 25, 108
P.3d 741. In contrast, statutes of repose are not subject to equitable tolling. Willis,
2015 UT App 123, ¶ 13 (six-year builder’s statute of repose is not subject to
equitable tolling); Strand, 2015 UT App 259, ¶ 4 (probate statute of repose is not
subject to equitable tolling). Instead, statutes of repose are tolled by statute.
Willis, 2015 UT App 123, ¶ 8 (“Once the statutory period set by a statute of
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repose expires, ‘any cause of action is barred regardless of usual reasons for
tolling the statute.”) (citing Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 219
(Utah 1984)).
The language of section 404 is unambiguous and contains a two-year
statute of limitation, two one-year statutes of limitation, and a four-year statute
of repose. This is true even though, as the district court noted, section 404 does
not use the label “statute of repose.” (R.419.) Section 404 reads:
(1) A malpractice action against a health care provider
shall be commenced within two years after the plaintiff
or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever
first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date
of the alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1):
(a) in an action where the allegation against the
health care provider is that a foreign object has
been wrongfully left within a patient's body,
the claim shall be barred unless commenced
within one year after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered, the existence of
the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient's
body, whichever first occurs; or
(b) in an action where it is alleged that a patient
has been prevented from discovering
misconduct on the part of a health care
provider because that health care provider has
affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the
alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred
unless commenced within one year after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence, should have discovered the
fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs.
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Utah Code § 78B-3-404(1) (emphases added).
The plain language of the statutory text is the best evidence of the
legislature’s intent. Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2013 UT 22, ¶ 15, 301 P.3d
984. Here, the plain language reveals that the two-year and one-year periods are
statutes of limitation because they run from the time the plaintiff “discovers” or
“should have discovered” the injury giving rise to the cause of action. Utah Code
78B-3-404(1), (2); Lee, 867 P.2d at 574. The plain language also reveals that the
four-year period is a statute of repose because it “bars all actions after a specified
period of time has run” from the occurrence of an event—i.e., the act alleged to
constitute malpractice. Berry, 717 P.2d at 672; Willis, 2015 UT App 123, ¶¶ 8-9.
Unsurprisingly, this court has repeatedly recognized that the four-year
period in section 404 is a statute of repose. For example, in Lee v. Gaufin, this
court noted that “[t]he four-year repose period in § 78–14–4(1) [now codified in
§ 78B-3-404(1)] runs from the commission of the alleged act of malpractice,
irrespective of whether the malpractice is known or knowable, and all causes of
action for malpractice not filed within that period are abolished.” 867 P.2d at 576.
And in Arnold v. Grigsby, this court noted that “[t]he Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act provides both a two-year statute of limitations and a four-year
statute of repose for the filing of medical malpractice actions.” 2012 UT 61, ¶ 13,
289 P.3d 449; see also Sorensen v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336, 1336 (Utah 1987)
(“Plaintiff’s cause of action is barred by the four-year statute of repose”).
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Because the four-year period in section 404 is a statute of repose, it is tolled
by section 416 only if (i) the phrase “statute of limitations” in section 416 refers to
the four-year statute of repose, or (ii) tolling the statutes of limitation and not the
statute of repose violates the absurdity doctrine. Neither circumstance applies.
2.

The District Court Erred When it Ruled that Section 416 Tolls the
Four-Year Statute of Repose
The district court erred when it ruled that section 416 tolls the four-year

statute of repose in section 404. Under section 416, filing a request for a
prelitigation panel review “tolls the applicable statute of limitations” until 60
days after one of several enumerated events. Utah Code § 78B-3-416(3)(a). By its
plain language, section 416 tolls the two- and one-year limitation periods, but not
the four-year statute of repose:
(3)(a) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel
review under this section tolls the applicable statute
of limitations until the later of:
(i) 60 days following the division’s issuance of:
(A) an opinion by the prelitigation panel; or
(B) a certificate of compliance under Section
78B-3-418; or the expiration of the time for
holding a hearing under Subsection (3)(b)(ii).
Id. (emphasis added). The district court erred when it ruled that section 416
tolled the statute of repose in addition to the statutes of limitation.
For questions of statutory interpretation, this court’s “primary goal is to
evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature,” and the best evidence of
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that intent is the plain language of the statutory text. Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ
Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Absent a contrary indication, the court will assume “that the legislature used
each term advisedly according to its ordinary and usually accepted meaning.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The court will “not view individual words and subsections in isolation”
but will instead construe each section “in connection with every other part or
section so as to produce a harmonious whole.” Summit Operating, LLC v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 2012 UT 91, ¶ 11, 293 P.3d 369 (internal quotation marks
omitted). And important here, the court “presume[s] that the expression of one
term should be interpreted as the exclusion of another.” Marion Energy, 2011 UT
50, ¶ 14 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
The phrase “statute of limitations” unambiguously refers to the two- and
one-year limitation periods in section 404 and does not encompass the four-year
statute of repose.4 As this court has recognized, statutes of limitation and statutes
of repose are “distinct entities” that “are not interchangeable.” Raithaus v. SaabScandia of Am., Inc., 784 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah 1989). This court should assume

It is worth noting that statutes of limitation were originally categorized as a
type of statute of repose at a time when the term “statute of repose” had a
broader meaning that encompassed any time restrictions on bringing suit. CTS
Corp. v. Walburger, 134 S.Ct. 2175, 2186 (2014). While all statutes of limitation
were statutes of repose, not all statutes of repose were statutes of limitation. But
contemporary law distinguishes statutes of limitation from statutes of repose. Id.
at 2185; Raithaus v. Saab-Scandia of Am., Inc., 784 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah 1989).
4
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that the legislature used “statute of limitations” advisedly, and according to its
ordinary and accepted meaning. Marion Energy, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14. And this court
should presume that the expression of one phrase—“statute of limitations”—
should be interpreted as the exclusion the other—“statute of repose.” Id.
Notably, elsewhere in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, the
legislature used different language that encompasses all limitation periods in the
Act. For example, section 412 extends “the time for commencing the malpractice
action” if the plaintiff serves the notice within 90 days of the “expiration of the
applicable time period.” Utah Code § 78B-3-412(4) (emphasis added); Forbes v. St.
Mark’s Hosp., 754 P.2d 933, 934 (Utah 1988) (because “applicable time period”
broadly refers to all time periods, section 412 extends the statute of repose).
Elsewhere, the Utah Code uses the phrase “statute of repose.” This shows
that the legislature uses “statute of limitation” and “statute of repose” according
to their ordinary—and distinct—meanings. For example, with respect to claims
involving asbestos, the legislature has expressly stated that “[a] statute of
limitation or repose may not bar an action.”5 Utah Code § 78B-2-117(1)(a); id.
§ 78B-2-116(1)(a) (same). And with respect to claims involving improvements to
real property, the legislature has stated that “it is in the best interest of citizens of
the state to impose the periods of limitation and repose provided in this chapter

This language first appeared in 1988, only three years after the language in
section 416 was enacted. Utah Code §§ 78-12-33.5, 78-12-48 (1988); Utah Code
§ 78-14-12(3) (1985).
5
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upon all causes of action,” and that the statute “does not extend the period of
limitation or repose otherwise prescribed by law.”6 Id. § 78B-2-225(2)(e), (9). The
legislature does not use the phrase “statute of limitation” to refer to statutes of
repose. Thus, by its plain language, section 416 tolls only the “applicable statute
of limitations” in section 404, not the statute of repose.
Intermountain explained in the district court that Mr. Jensen’s claim was
time-barred because section 416 tolled only the “statute of limitations,” not the
statute of repose. (R.413.) But the court “reject[ed] that argument as a matter of
statutory interpretation.” (R.413.) The court instead ruled that “[t]he Act—read
as a whole—does not manifest an intent by the legislature to treat the four-year
statute different from the two-year statute.” (R.414.) The court concluded that
section 416 tolls both the applicable statutes of limitation and the statute of
repose. (R.424.)
The court articulated four reasons for its ruling, none of which is sufficient
to contravene the plain language of section 416.
Titles - First, the court ruled that the title of section 404 indicates that the
four-year period is a statute of limitation. The court noted that section 404 does
not expressly use the phrase “statute of repose,” and that the four-year period is
listed within a section entitled “Statute of limitations.” (R.418.) Based upon the
title of the statute, the court concluded that section 404 must include only
This language was enacted in 1991, only seven years after section 416 was
enacted. Utah Code § 78-12-25.5 (1991); Utah Code § 78-14-12(3) (1985).
6
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statutes of limitation. (R.418.) From there, the court concluded that because 416 is
titled “Statutes of limitations tolled,” section 416 must toll all limitation periods
found within section 404, including the four-year period. (R.418.)
But under Utah law, “a statute’s title is not part of its text and cannot be
used as a tool of statutory construction unless the statute’s language is
ambiguous.” Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ¶ 42, 116 P.3d 323 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Section 404 and 416 are both unambiguous. Indeed,
the district court did not rule otherwise. The district court therefore erred in
considering the title as a tool of interpretation.
The error in the district court’s reasoning becomes more apparent when its
theory is applied to the other statutes of repose in the Utah Code. There is no
section of the Utah Code titled “Statute of Repose,” and yet there are several
recognized statutes of repose in the Utah Code under various section titles. If the
titles were dispositive—as the district court ruled—then there would be no
statutes of repose. For example, Chapter 2 of Title 78B is titled “Statutes of
Limitations,” but there are several statutes of repose within Chapter 2. Indeed,
the section containing the builder’s six- and nine-year statutes of repose is titled
“Actions related to improvements in real property.” Utah Code § 78B-2-225;
Willis v. DeWitt, 2015 UT App 123, ¶ 8-9, 350 P.3d 250 (six-year period in section
225 is a statute of repose by its plain language). And the section containing the
four-year statute of repose to challenge the holder of tax title to real property is
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titled “Seizure or possession within seven years—Proviso—Tax title.” Utah Code
§ 78B-2-205.
Titles are no more informative outside of Chapter 2. The one-year statute
of repose for establishing an unsolemnized marriage is in a section titled
“Validity of marriage not solemnized.” Utah Code § 30-1-4.5; In re Marriage of
Kunz, 2006 UT App 151, ¶ 21, 136 P.3d 1278 (one-year time limit is a statute of
repose). Finally, the three-year statute of repose in the probate code is in a section
titled “Probate and testacy proceedings—Ultimate time limit—Presumption and
order of intestacy.” Utah Code § 75-3-107(1); In re Estate of Strand, 2015 UT App
259, ¶ 4, 362 P.3d 739 (three-year period in the Probate Code is a statute of
repose). None of these denote the specific presence of a statute of repose as
opposed to a statute of limitation in their titles. The titles of section 404 and 416
are therefore not a basis for ignoring the plain language of section 404 and
treating the statute of repose as a statute of limitation.
“Applicable Statute of Limitations” – Second, the district court ruled that
the four-year period was a statute of limitation because “Section 416 refers to the
‘applicable statute of limitations’ which infers that Section 404 contains more than
one statute of limitation.” (R.418 (citing Utah Code § 78B-3-416(3)(a)).) The court
concluded that, to give meaning to the “applicable statute of limitations”
language in section 416, the four-year period must be a statute of limitation, not a
statute of repose. The district court’s conclusion relies on an incorrect assumption
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that section 404 contains only one statute of limitation if the four-year period is a
statute of repose.
In fact, section 404 includes three statutes of limitation: (i) a general twoyear statute of limitation beginning when the plaintiff discovers or should have
discovered the injury, (ii) a one-year statute of limitation for actions alleging
fraudulent concealment, and (iii) a one-year statute of limitation for actions
alleging that an object has been wrongfully left within a patient’s body. Utah
Code § 78B-3-405. These are the potential “applicable statute[s] of limitations”
referenced in section 416. Contrary to the district court’s ruling, the statute of
repose need not be treated as a statute of limitation to give meaning to the
“applicable” statute of limitation language in section 416.
Imprecision of Legislature and Appellate Courts - Next, the district court
treated the statute of repose as a statute of limitation because (i) the legislature
did not “use the phrase ‘statute of repose’ in the Act,” (ii) the “appellate courts,
when addressing this statute, have been similarly imprecise,” and (iii) it would
therefore “be inequitable and impractical to require litigants to interpret Section
404 with a level of precision that neither the legislature nor appellate courts of
this state have recognized.” (R.419.)
But as discussed above, there is nothing confusing about whether the fouryear period is a statute of repose, as this court recognized in Grigsby, Lee, and
Sorenson. It is how the time period operates, not its label, which determines
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whether it is a statute of limitation or statute of repose. The four-year period is a
statute of repose regardless of whether the legislature labeled it as such.
Next, in support of its assertion that the appellate courts “have been
similarly imprecise,” the district court cites three opinions. (R.419.) But none of
the opinions were imprecise in their treatments of the repose period. In fact, the
four-year period was not at issue in two of the opinions. In Platts, the issue was
whether a treatment program involved “a ‘health care provider’ under the
Malpractice Act.” Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997).
The Platts opinion does not mention the four-year period, let alone label it
imprecisely. And in McDougal, the issue was whether “the two-year medical
malpractice statute of limitations is tolled” until the plaintiff discovers the
defendant’s identity. McDougal v. Weed, 945 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
The court mentioned the four-year period only in its quotation of the statute. Id.
at 176-77. The court did not discuss or otherwise imprecisely label the period. Id.
In the third opinion, Forbes, this court discussed the four-year period, but it
did not do so imprecisely. The question in Forbes focused upon section 412 (thencodified in section 78-14-8), which extends “the time for commencing the
malpractice action.” Forbes v. St. Mark’s Hosp., 754 P.2d 933, 934 (Utah 1988). The
question was whether section 412 extends “only the two-year limitation period.”
Id. Although this court did not label the four-year period as a statute of repose,
the question was not before the court. Id. And the court repeatedly distinguished
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the two time periods, calling the statute of limitation “the limitation period,” “the
two-year statute of limitations,” or “the two-year limitation period,” and calling
the repose period “[t]he four-year statutory period” or the “four-year statutory
time period.” Id. at 934, 935. The court did not refer to the four-year period as a
statute of limitation.
Instead, as discussed above, this court has repeatedly and consistently
recognized that the four-year period in section 404 is a statute of repose. Arnold v.
Grigsby, 2012 UT 61, ¶ 13, 289 P.3d 449 ( “[t]he Utah Health Care Malpractice Act
provides . . . a four-year statute of repose for the filing of medical malpractice
actions”); Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 576 (Utah 1993) (referencing “[t]he four-year
repose period” in the Act); Sorensen v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336, 1336 (Utah 1987)
(“Plaintiff’s cause of action is barred by the four-year statute of repose” in the
Act).
The court has not been imprecise, let alone so imprecise as to justify
departing from the plain language and treating the statute of repose as if it were
a statute of limitation under section 416.
“Tolled” for Other Reasons - Finally, the district court ruled that the fouryear period was a statute of limitation because, unlike many other statutes of
repose, the four-year period “may be extended or tolled for at least four
recognized reasons.” (R.419.) Specifically, the court listed the two one-year
statutes of limitation in section 404, the statutory extension in section 412, and the
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constitutional exception for periods of minority under what is now section 404.
(R.419.) The district court seems to have ruled that, because there are statutory
exceptions to the four-year period, it is not a statute of repose.
But the exceptions confirm that the four-year period is a statute of repose.
As a preliminary matter, two of the court’s four examples—the two one-year
statutes of limitation—do not toll the statute of repose but instead apply
“[n]otwithstanding” the statute of repose. Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2). The court
was therefore mistaken when it concluded that they “extended or tolled” the
statute of repose. (R.419.)
The statutory extension in section 412 also confirms that the legislature
intended the four-year period to be a statute of repose. Section 412 extends “the
time for commencing the malpractice action” if the plaintiff serves the notice
within 90 days of the “expiration of the applicable time period.” Utah Code
§ 78B-3-412(4) (emphasis added). The statute does not use the phrase “statute of
limitations,” but instead broadly refers to “the applicable time period.” Based
upon that difference, this court has held that section 412 extends all applicable
time periods in section 404. Forbes, 754 P.2d at 934-35 (Utah 1988).
And the fact that section 412 operates to extend the four-year period is
consistent with its being a statute of repose. As discussed above, it is well-settled
that statutes of repose may be extended or limited by statute. Willis, 2015 UT
App 123, ¶ 8 (“Once the statutory period set by a statute of repose expires, ‘any
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cause of action is barred regardless of usual reasons for tolling the statute.’”
(citing Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 219 (Utah 1984))).
Indeed, other well-settled statutes of repose in the Utah Code are subject to
statutory exceptions. For example, the builder’s statute of repose provides that a
claim must be filed within six years from the date of completion or abandonment
of construction, except “[w]here an express contract or warranty establishes a
different period of limitations.” Utah Code § 78B-2-225(3)(a); Willis, 2015 UT App
123, ¶¶ 8-9 (plain language of section 225 indicates that it is a statute of repose).
Similarly, there are three enumerated statutory exceptions to the statute of repose
in the probate code. Utah Code § 75-3-107(1); In re Estate of Strand, 2015 UT App
259, ¶ 6, 362 P.3d 739 (recognizing exceptions to the statute of repose in the
probate code).
The final exception relied upon by the district court, the constitutional
exception for periods of minority under what is now section 404, also confirms
that the four-year period is a statute of repose. The district court relied upon Lee
v. Gaufin, an opinion in which this court held that the four-year statute of repose
was unconstitutional as applied to minors under the uniform operation of laws
provision of the Utah Constitution. 867 P.2d 572, 589 (Utah 1993). The Lee court
necessarily held that the statute of repose was not statutorily tolled, which is why
the court reached the constitutional question. Id. at 575. The Lee opinion therefore
confirms that the four-year period is a statute of repose.
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3.

Neither the Absurd Consequences Canon Nor the Absurdity Doctrine
Warrant A Reading Contrary to the Plain Unambiguous Statutory
Language
Although not entirely clear, at times the district court appears to have

refused to enforce the plain language of section 416 on policy grounds, citing
unfairness. (R.420,421,423.) Such considerations can be relevant under two
distinct doctrines, neither of which applies here.
The first doctrine is the absurd consequence canon of construction. This
court applies the canon only after finding that statutory language is ambiguous.
Utley v. Mill Man Steel, Inc., 2015 UT 75, ¶¶ 46, 47, 357 P.3d 992. Applying the
canon, the court resolves the ambiguity “by choosing the reading that avoids
absurd results.” Id. ¶ 47 (internal quotation marks omitted). While the district
court’s reasoning is unclear, Intermountain will address the absurd consequences
canon because the district court cited a case employing that canon. (R.423 (citing
In re Adoption of Baby B., 2012 UT 35, ¶ 78, 308 P.3d 382 (discussing absurd canon
of construction).) As demonstrated below, the canon does not apply because the
phrase “statute of limitations” is not ambiguous.
The second doctrine is the absurdity doctrine. This court applies the
absurdity doctrine where there is no ambiguity but “applying the language leads
to results so overwhelmingly absurd no rational legislature could have intended
them.” Utley, 2015 UT 75, ¶ 46. Applying the cannon, the court will “interpret the
statute contrary to its plain meaning.” Id. ¶ 47 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Again, while the district court’s reasoning is unclear, Intermountain
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will address this doctrine because the district court cited a case applying this
doctrine. (R.423 (citing Savage v. Utah Youth Village, 2004 UT 102, ¶ 18, 104 P.3d
1242 (discussing absurdity doctrine).) As demonstrated below, this doctrine also
does not apply because there is nothing unreasonable, let alone overwhelmingly
absurd, about failing to toll a statute of repose.
3.1

The Absurd Canon of Construction Does Not Apply Because
“Statute of Limitations” is Unambiguous

The absurd consequences canon allows a court to resolve an ambiguity
when the statutory language lends itself to two reasonable interpretations. Utley,
2015 UT 75, ¶ 46. In those circumstances, the canon allows the court to reject the
interpretation that produces absurd results. Id. The canon does not apply here
because the statutory language—“statute of limitations”—is unambiguous.
Indeed, “[a] statute is ambiguous only if it is reasonably susceptible of
different interpretations.” State v. Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 22, 309 P.3d 209
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, for section 416 to be ambiguous, the
language “tolls the applicable statute of limitations” must be susceptible of being
read as “tolls the applicable statute of repose.” Utah Code § 78B-3-416(3)(a).
But the phrase “statute of limitations” is a legal term of art with a precise
meaning. It is defined as “[a] law that bars claims after a specified period” or “a
statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when
the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered).” Statute of
Limitations, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also, e.g., Raithaus v. Saab-
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Scandia of Am., Inc., 784 P.2d 1158, 1160 (Utah 1989) (“A statute of limitations
requires a lawsuit to be filed within a specified period of time after a legal right
has been violated.”); Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672
(Utah 1985) (same).
As discussed above, statutes of limitation are distinct from and not
interchangeable with statutes of repose. Indeed, the Black’s Law definition of
“statute of limitations” instructs the reader to compare to “statute of repose,”
indicating that the two definitions are distinct. Or as this court put it, “[s]tatutes
of repose . . . are different from statutes of limitations, although to some extent
they serve the same ends.” Raithaus, 784 P.2d at 1160 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, there is no ambiguity in the statute. The court erred to the extent
its ruling can be read as finding and relying on an ambiguity to interpret “statute
of limitations” to mean “statute of repose.”
3.2

The Absurdity Doctrine Does Not Apply Because the Legislature’s
Decision Not to Toll the Repose Period Is Not Overwhelmingly
Absurd

The absurdity doctrine allows a court to refuse to enforce the plain
language of a statute—and adopt an alternative interpretation—when the
operation of the plain language is “so overwhelmingly absurd that no rational
legislator could have intended the statute to operate in such a manner.” Utley,
2015 UT 75, ¶ 48. The doctrine does not apply here because the tolling provision
in section 416 produces a rational result, particularly when viewed at the time
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the legislature enacted it. State ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 13, 165 P.3d 1206 (“a
result must be so absurd that the legislative body which authored the legislation
could not have intended it” (emphasis added)).
Applying the absurdity doctrine is a “momentous” and “drastic step”
because it overrides the plain language of the statute and applies an
interpretation that is “contrary to its plain meaning.” Utley, 2015 UT 75, ¶¶ 47-48
(Durrant, J., concurring and dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
court applies the doctrine “with caution” and the court will not override
statutory language “even if it leads to results [this court] regard[s] as impractical
or ill-advised.” Id. ¶ 48. Instead, for this court to apply the absurdity doctrine to
override the plain language, “the operation of the plain language must be more
than improvident, it must be so overwhelmingly absurd that no rational
legislator could have intended the statute to operate in such a manner.” Id.
To determine whether no rational legislator could have intended section
416 to toll only statutes of limitation, the court looks to the statute at the time it
was enacted. State ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 13 (“a result must be so absurd that
the legislative body which authored the legislation could not have intended it”
(emphasis added)). The language of section 416 first appeared in 1985 when the
legislature added the prelitigation panel review requirement. Utah Code § 78-1412(3) (1985) (attached at Add. C). At that time, the Act neither contemplated nor
required affidavits of merit or certificates of compliance. Compare id. §§ 78-14-4 to
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-16 (1985), with Utah Code § 78B-3-418, -423. Instead, under the Act at the time,
the prelitigation panel lost jurisdiction if it did not act within the specified time
period. Utah Code § 78-14-13(3) (1985) (“A panel retains jurisdiction of any claim
for 90 days from the date of filing the request.”). Thus, to the extent the
requirements later added to the Act led the district court to consider the plain
language interpretation to produce “unfair” and “undesired” results, those
considerations are beside the point. (R.421-23.)
Regardless, the absurdity doctrine also does not apply under the current
version of the Act, which Intermountain will demonstrate next.
The Prelitigation Process Under the Current Act - The typical
prelitigation procedure progresses as follows: a claimant files a Notice of Intent
to make a claim under section 78B-3-412, which provides an extension of 120
days if the claimant is within 90 days of the expiration of any time limitation. The
claimant then (usually concurrently) files a request for prelitigation panel review
under section 416, which tolls the applicable statute of limitation until 60 days
after the issuance of either the panel’s opinion or a certificate of compliance.
Utah Code § 78B-3-416(3). If either the panel proceedings exceed 180 days or the
respondents are uncooperative, the claimant may file an affidavit of merit to
secure a certificate of compliance, which the panel must address within 15 days
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of its filing.7 Id. That mechanism places a claimant beyond the whim of the panel
or the respondent, and requires that the claim be addressed in a timely manner.
The district court articulated two reasons for reading the statute contrary
to its plain language. First, the court ruled that it “would be unfair” to require
claimants to comply with the prelitigation procedures without tolling the statute
of repose during the time it takes to complete those procedures and that the plain
language reading therefore “does nothing to advance the policy concerns
recognized by the legislature when it passed the Act.” (R.422.) Second, the court
ruled that applying the plain language would force claimants to file premature
lawsuits to avoid the effect of the statute of repose. (R.423.) But as discussed
below, these results are not “so overwhelmingly absurd that no rational
legislature could have intended the statute to operate in such a manner.” Utley,
2015 UT 75, ¶ 48. Intermountain will address both reasons in turn.
3.2.1

It is Not Overwhelmingly Absurd that the Legislature
Limited Liability to a Specific Period

The operation of the plain language of section 416 does not produce
overwhelmingly absurd results, even if it may operate unfairly in a few cases. As

The division must complete the prelitigation panel within 180 days after the
filing of the request. Utah Code § 78B-3-416(3)(b)(ii)(A). If the division fails to do
so, the claimant may file an affidavit of merit including, among other things, an
affidavit signed by a health care provider who agrees that the claim is
meritorious. Id. § 78B-3-416(3)(c)(i). Alternatively, if the respondent “has failed to
reasonably cooperate in scheduling the hearing,” the claimant may file an
affidavit any time within the 180 days making that allegation, and the division
must rule on the affidavit within fifteen days. Id. § 78B-3-416(3)(c)(ii), (d)(i).
7
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the district court recognized, the legislature enacted the four-year statute of
repose to limit the time by which a claimant must file an actions against a health
care provider so that insurance premiums can be managed and calculated:
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the Legislature
to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be
commenced against health care providers while limiting
that time to a specific period for which professional
liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and
accurately calculated; and to provide other procedural
changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of
claims.
Utah Code § 78B-3-402(3); (R.422).
Tolling the statute of limitation but not the statute of repose upon the filing
of a request for prelitigation panel review also is consistent with that policy.
Specifically, tolling the statute of limitation until after the division issues a
certificate of compliance ensures that a claimant will have a “reasonable time” to
bring his claim even if the process would otherwise prevent his filing within the
one- or two-year limitation periods. Tolling the statute of limitation ensures that
the claimant has a “reasonable” window within which to file a claim.
Enforcing the plain language and refusing to toll the statute of repose, as
the legislature put it, “limit[s] that time to a specified period for which
professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately
calculated.” Utah Code § 78B-3-402(3). This rationale is not absurd, and it does
not lead to an overwhelmingly absurd result or absurd rationale. Any unfairness
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is the same unfairness created by statutes of repose generally. The absurdity
doctrine does not apply to negate the plain language of section 416.
3.2.2

It is Not Overwhelmingly Absurd that Claimants May
File a Premature Lawsuit to Avoid the Operation of a
Statute of Limitation or Repose

Both the Act and opinions from this court have recognized that, in some
cases, a claimant may file a premature lawsuit to avoid the effect of the limitation
or repose period. The district court erred in ruling that this possible result of
enforcing the plain language would be “inoperable and would result in absurd
consequences.” (R.423 (internal quotation marks omitted).)
In fact, the Act expressly recognizes that a claimant may file a lawsuit
before completing the prelitigation procedures. Section 78B-3-423 states that if a
claimant “does not file an affidavit of merit,” then “the division may not issue a
certificate of compliance for the claimant and the malpractice action shall be
dismissed by the court.” Utah Code § 78B-3-423(6) (emphasis added). In other
words, while forbidding it in section 412, the Act expressly contemplates that a
claimant can file a malpractice action in court before completing the requisite
procedures; otherwise, there could never be a malpractice action to dismiss.
This court confirmed this result in McBride-Williams v. Huard, 2004 UT 21,
¶ 10, 94 P.3d 175. In McBride, this court held that claimants may file medical
malpractice claims “irrespective of whether they have heeded the preconditions
imposed by the Malpractice Act.” Id. Indeed, in McBride, the claimant filed a
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timely lawsuit before beginning the prelitigation procedures. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. Their
complaint was dismissed for failure to comply with the procedures. Id. ¶ 3. They
complied with the procedures but did not file his second complaint until after the
statute of limitation elapsed. Id. ¶ 4. This court held that the second complaint
was timely under the savings statute, now codified as section 78B-2-111. Id. ¶ 17.
The court squarely held that a claimant is allowed to file a malpractice
lawsuit without first complying with the prelitigation procedures. Id. ¶ 10.
Specifically, the court held that “[r]ule 3 sets out the manner by which a party
may bring a civil matter to the attention of the court. [The prelitigation
procedures do] not erect a barrier at the courthouse door, barring entry to
medical malpractice claimants who have failed to comply with compulsory
prelitigation procedures. Claimants are at liberty to commence an action by filing
and serving a complaint under rule 3 irrespective of whether they have heeded
the preconditions imposed by the Malpractice Act.” Id. The court clarified,
however, that it “adopt[ed] this position without endorsing the [claimant]’s
apparent wholesale disregard of the prelitigation procedures mandated by the
Malpractice Act.” Id. ¶ 11.
The district court rejected the McBride holding as “dicta.” (R.422,423.) But
the McBride holding is not dicta. McBride squarely addressed—and rejected—the
district court’s position here that claimants cannot file premature lawsuits and
that it would be absurd to allow claimants to do so in narrow circumstances.
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McBride reveals that the result of enforcing the plain language of the statuteperhaps requiring a few claimants to file premature lawsuits- is not absurd.
Further, even if a claimant could not file a premature lawsuit, the
operation of the statute is not absurd. The statute allows a plaintiff to require the
prelitigation panel to hold a hearing within 180 days of a request, and the panel
must issue an opinion no later than 30 days after the hearing. Utah Code
§§ 78B-3-416(3)(b)(ii)(A), -418(2), (3). If the panel does not hold a hearing before

the 180-day deadline, then the plaintiff may submit an affidavit of merit under
section 78B-3-423, which then requires the division to provide a certificate of
compliance. Id. §§ 78B-3-416(3)(c), -418. A claimant therefore can determine,
roughly, what is a safe date to request review by a prelitigation panel in relation
to the expiration of the four-year statute of repose.
Regardless, to the extent the operation of the statute of repose can produce
an unfair result, the result is not overwhelmingly absurd. All legislative decisions
to create statutes of repose instead of statutes of limitation sacrifice fairness on
legislative policy grounds. uWhile this outcome may seem harsh in that it
deprives the [party] of an opportunity to litigate any claim to the [merits], it is
the necessary result of having limitation periods and the accompanying benefit
of finality for which these statutes were designed." Beaver Cty. v. Utah State Tax

Comm'n, 2006 UT 6,

~

46,128 P.3d 1187. Thus, the operation of the plain
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language of the statute is not absurd, let alone so u overwhelmingly absurd" to
justify the court's refusal to enforce the plain language of the statute.
Conclusion

Mr. Jensen's claims are barred by the four-year statute of repose in section
78B-3-404(1). Section 78B-3-416 did not operate to toll the statute of repose. This
co-urt should reverse the district court's ruling and remand with instructions for
the court to dismiss Mr. Jensen's claims as untimely.
DATED this 4th day of January, 2017.
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